Question 9 During an antitrust investigation , the Commission discovered that the CEOs of eight concrete suppliers held a secret meeting whose purpose was to discuss price forecasts and output goals as a result of the low profitability and high input cost of the industry. They agreed to a system of public quarterly price forecast announcements and devised initiatives to ensure compliance with their output and pricing goals. They also agreed to regular meetings where they would exchange information to monitor adherence to their goals. In these meetings they would usually enter into further agreements to maintain effective pursuit of their objectives. After a while two of the companies stopped attending the regular meetings and abandoned the quarterly announcement mechanisms. At the same time three new companies entered the market and were invited to participate in the secret meetings. Two of these companies agreed to the existing terms and to attend future meetings. The other company declined to participate in further meetings but also began to employ the system of public price announcements. Is there a single overall agreement constituting a cartel? Are there concerted practices? Cases Joined Cases T-305/94 to T-307/94 T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94 T-325/94, T-328/94, T- 329/94, T-335/94 - LVM v Commission [1999] Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95 , T-30/95 to T-32/95, T-34/95 to T-39/95, T-42/95 to T- 46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95 to T-65/95, T-68/95 to T-71/95 T-87/95, T-88/8; , I-103/95, I-104/95- Cimenteries CBR v Commission [2000] Case T-7/89-SA Hercules Chemicals NV V Commission [1991]

Question

Question 9 During an antitrust investigation , the Commission discovered that the CEOs of eight concrete suppliers held a secret meeting whose purpose was to discuss price forecasts and output goals as a result of the low profitability and high input cost of the industry. They agreed to a system of public quarterly price forecast announcements and devised initiatives to ensure compliance with their output and pricing goals. They also agreed to regular meetings where they would exchange information to monitor adherence to their goals. In these meetings they would usually enter into further agreements to maintain effective pursuit of their objectives. After a while two of the companies stopped attending the regular meetings and abandoned the quarterly announcement mechanisms. At the same time three new companies entered the market and were invited to participate in the secret meetings. Two of these companies agreed to the existing terms and to attend future meetings. The other company declined to participate in further meetings but also began to employ the system of public price announcements. Is there a single overall agreement constituting a cartel? Are there concerted practices? Cases Joined Cases T-305/94 to T-307/94 T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94 T-325/94, T-328/94, T- 329/94, T-335/94 - LVM v Commission [1999] Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95 , T-30/95 to T-32/95, T-34/95 to T-39/95, T-42/95 to T- 46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95 to T-65/95, T-68/95 to T-71/95 T-87/95, T-88/8; , I-103/95, I-104/95- Cimenteries CBR v Commission [2000] Case T-7/89-SA Hercules Chemicals NV V Commission [1991]

Answer 1

In the scenario described, there is evidence of a single overall agreement constituting a cartel. The CEOs of the concrete suppliers engaged in activities that are characteristic of a cartel, such as holding secret meetings to discuss price forecasts and output goals, agreeing on public quarterly price forecast announcements, and devising initiatives to ensure compliance with their pricing and output objectives. These actions demonstrate a coordinated effort to control market conditions, which is a hallmark of cartel behavior.Additionally, the regular meetings to exchange information and monitor adherence to these goals further indicate concerted practices among the companies involved. Even though some companies stopped participating and new ones joined, the core activities and objectives remained consistent, suggesting an ongoing concerted practice aimed at restricting competition.The cases mentioned, such as LVM v Commission and Cimenteries CBR v Commission, provide legal precedents where similar behaviors were scrutinized under antitrust laws, reinforcing the interpretation that such coordinated actions constitute a cartel and involve concerted practices.

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